Micro-Pollutant Regulation in the River Rhine
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Micro-Pollutant Regulation in the River Rhine
Cooperation in a Common-Pool Resource Problem Setting
Herzog, Laura M.J.
Springer Nature Switzerland AG
03/2020
336
Dura
Inglês
9783030367695
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Contents Abbreviations Illustrations Tables Annexes Illustrations in the Annex Tables in the Annex Acknowledgements Synopsis Introduction 1.1 The CPR and the policy problem of micro-pollutants in surface water 1.2 Defining the key terms: management process, collaboration & cooperation 1.3 Theoretical background, methodological approach & findings 1.4 Societal relevance of the research 1.5 Structure of the dissertation 2. Literature Review 2.1 Theories of non-cooperation 2.1.1 The prisoner's dilemma-a non-cooperative, nonzero-sum game 2.1.2 The tragedy of the commons 2.1.3 The theory of collective inaction 2.2 Theoretical concepts on collective action and common-pool resources 2.2.1 A theoretical concept of cooperation's core relationships 2.2.2 Preconditions for collective action in CPR settings 2.2.3 The IAD framework-an analytical tool to assess collective action 2.3 Governance and cooperation 2.3.1 A typology of the governance concept 2.3.2 Environmental and collaborative governance 3. Theory & Hypotheses 3.1 A first driver for cooperation-recognizing the environmental problem 3.2 A second driver for cooperation-forums 3.3 A third driver for cooperation-actors' shared beliefs 3.4 Theoretical relevance of the research 4. Research Design 4.1 Public policy analysis 4.1.1 The policy-making process 4.1.2 The policy problem 4.1.3 The solutions to a policy problem 4.1.4 Policy networks 4.2 The conceptual framework guiding the research design 4.2.1 The Social-Ecological System framework (SESF) 4.2.2 Critique of the SESF 4.3 Operationalization of the dependent and independent variables along the SESF 4.3.1 The dependent variable cooperation 4.3.2 The independent variables 4.3.3 The control variables 4.4 Case study selection criteria & case study design 4.4.1 The case study selection criteria 4.4.2 A within- and across-unit case study design 4.5 Presentation of the three case studies 4.5.1 The micro-pollutant management process at the Rhine basin at Basel 4.5.2 The micro-pollutant management process in the Ruhr region 4.5.3 The micro-pollutant management process in the Moselle basin 4.5.4 Similarities and differences between the case studies 4.6 The data gathering methods 4.6.1 Document analysis 4.6.2 Actor identification 4.6.3 Expert interviews 4.6.4 The survey and the methodological operationalization of the variables 4.6.5 Response rates & handling missing data 4.7 The data analysis methods 4.7.1 Descriptive Social Network Analysis 4.7.2 Exponential random graph models 4.7.3 Qualitative Analysis-a case comparison 5. Analysis I: What Defines Cooperation? 5.1 The constituting elements of cooperation 5.1.1 Aiming towards the same goal 5.1.2 Coordinating each other's actions-actors' collaboration 5.1.3 Exchanging resources 5.1.4 Relating the three elements 5.2 A network perspective on the main element of cooperation: collaboration 5.2.1 The macro-level: reciprocity, fragmentation & components 5.2.2 The meso-level: factions 5.2.3 The micro-level: core, important, and peripheral actors 5.3 Actors' viewpoints on cooperation 5.3.1 ... in the Basel case study 5.3.2 ... in the Ruhr case study 5.3.3 ... in the Moselle case study 5.3.4 Summary of the actors' perspectives on cooperation 5.4 Comparison I: Cooperation across the cases 5.4.1 Different intensities of cooperation 5.4.2 The CPR management processses as types of governance 5.4.3 Cooperation at different stages 6. Analysis II: What Explains Collaboration at the Dyadic Level? 6.1 The ERGMs' goodness of fit 6.2 Presenting the ERGM results 6.3 Model robustness checks 7. Discussion: What Triggers Collaboration and Cooperation in a CPR Problem Setting? 7.1 Discussion of the hypotheses 7.1.1 Hypotheses 1a & 1b: the impact of problem perception on cooperation 7.1.2 Hypotheses 2a & 2b: the impact of actors' participation in forums on cooperation 7.1.3 Hypothesis 3: the impact of actors' shared beliefs on cooperation 7.1.4 The control variables: the impact of actors' attributes on cooperation 7.1.5 Summary of the discussion 7.2 Comparison II: Factors enhancing cooperation across the cases 7.2.1 Problem perception as initial trigger (IV 1a) 7.2.2 Actors' similar viewpoint on the CPR problem (IV 1b) 7.2.3 Conclusion 1: The timing of actors' problem perception matters 7.2.4 Forums consolidating cooperation (IVs 2a & 2b) 7.2.5 Forums' bridging and bonding capital (IVs 2a & 2b) 7.2.6 Conclusion 2: Forums reinforce cooperation in CPR problem situations 7.2.7 Conclusion 3: Shared beliefs (IV 3) make no difference 7.3 Summary of the case comparison 8. Conclusion 8.1 The findings-factors contributing to cooperation in a CPR problem setting 8.2 Explanatory strength of the results 8.3 Discussing the methods 8.4 Contributions to theory Bibliography Annex
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Contents Abbreviations Illustrations Tables Annexes Illustrations in the Annex Tables in the Annex Acknowledgements Synopsis Introduction 1.1 The CPR and the policy problem of micro-pollutants in surface water 1.2 Defining the key terms: management process, collaboration & cooperation 1.3 Theoretical background, methodological approach & findings 1.4 Societal relevance of the research 1.5 Structure of the dissertation 2. Literature Review 2.1 Theories of non-cooperation 2.1.1 The prisoner's dilemma-a non-cooperative, nonzero-sum game 2.1.2 The tragedy of the commons 2.1.3 The theory of collective inaction 2.2 Theoretical concepts on collective action and common-pool resources 2.2.1 A theoretical concept of cooperation's core relationships 2.2.2 Preconditions for collective action in CPR settings 2.2.3 The IAD framework-an analytical tool to assess collective action 2.3 Governance and cooperation 2.3.1 A typology of the governance concept 2.3.2 Environmental and collaborative governance 3. Theory & Hypotheses 3.1 A first driver for cooperation-recognizing the environmental problem 3.2 A second driver for cooperation-forums 3.3 A third driver for cooperation-actors' shared beliefs 3.4 Theoretical relevance of the research 4. Research Design 4.1 Public policy analysis 4.1.1 The policy-making process 4.1.2 The policy problem 4.1.3 The solutions to a policy problem 4.1.4 Policy networks 4.2 The conceptual framework guiding the research design 4.2.1 The Social-Ecological System framework (SESF) 4.2.2 Critique of the SESF 4.3 Operationalization of the dependent and independent variables along the SESF 4.3.1 The dependent variable cooperation 4.3.2 The independent variables 4.3.3 The control variables 4.4 Case study selection criteria & case study design 4.4.1 The case study selection criteria 4.4.2 A within- and across-unit case study design 4.5 Presentation of the three case studies 4.5.1 The micro-pollutant management process at the Rhine basin at Basel 4.5.2 The micro-pollutant management process in the Ruhr region 4.5.3 The micro-pollutant management process in the Moselle basin 4.5.4 Similarities and differences between the case studies 4.6 The data gathering methods 4.6.1 Document analysis 4.6.2 Actor identification 4.6.3 Expert interviews 4.6.4 The survey and the methodological operationalization of the variables 4.6.5 Response rates & handling missing data 4.7 The data analysis methods 4.7.1 Descriptive Social Network Analysis 4.7.2 Exponential random graph models 4.7.3 Qualitative Analysis-a case comparison 5. Analysis I: What Defines Cooperation? 5.1 The constituting elements of cooperation 5.1.1 Aiming towards the same goal 5.1.2 Coordinating each other's actions-actors' collaboration 5.1.3 Exchanging resources 5.1.4 Relating the three elements 5.2 A network perspective on the main element of cooperation: collaboration 5.2.1 The macro-level: reciprocity, fragmentation & components 5.2.2 The meso-level: factions 5.2.3 The micro-level: core, important, and peripheral actors 5.3 Actors' viewpoints on cooperation 5.3.1 ... in the Basel case study 5.3.2 ... in the Ruhr case study 5.3.3 ... in the Moselle case study 5.3.4 Summary of the actors' perspectives on cooperation 5.4 Comparison I: Cooperation across the cases 5.4.1 Different intensities of cooperation 5.4.2 The CPR management processses as types of governance 5.4.3 Cooperation at different stages 6. Analysis II: What Explains Collaboration at the Dyadic Level? 6.1 The ERGMs' goodness of fit 6.2 Presenting the ERGM results 6.3 Model robustness checks 7. Discussion: What Triggers Collaboration and Cooperation in a CPR Problem Setting? 7.1 Discussion of the hypotheses 7.1.1 Hypotheses 1a & 1b: the impact of problem perception on cooperation 7.1.2 Hypotheses 2a & 2b: the impact of actors' participation in forums on cooperation 7.1.3 Hypothesis 3: the impact of actors' shared beliefs on cooperation 7.1.4 The control variables: the impact of actors' attributes on cooperation 7.1.5 Summary of the discussion 7.2 Comparison II: Factors enhancing cooperation across the cases 7.2.1 Problem perception as initial trigger (IV 1a) 7.2.2 Actors' similar viewpoint on the CPR problem (IV 1b) 7.2.3 Conclusion 1: The timing of actors' problem perception matters 7.2.4 Forums consolidating cooperation (IVs 2a & 2b) 7.2.5 Forums' bridging and bonding capital (IVs 2a & 2b) 7.2.6 Conclusion 2: Forums reinforce cooperation in CPR problem situations 7.2.7 Conclusion 3: Shared beliefs (IV 3) make no difference 7.3 Summary of the case comparison 8. Conclusion 8.1 The findings-factors contributing to cooperation in a CPR problem setting 8.2 Explanatory strength of the results 8.3 Discussing the methods 8.4 Contributions to theory Bibliography Annex
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
